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JOHANNA OKSALA 
I want to begin by thanking Professor Stawarska for her careful reading of  my book Feminist 
Experiences and for her critical insights on some of  its key ideas. Before I go into a more detailed 
discussion of  the two guiding questions she poses for me, I would like to clear one possible mis-
understanding. Stawarska suggests in various places that my book is intended as a critique of  
phenomenology from the external perspective of  Foucauldian genealogy. She writes, for exam-
ple, that my “sympathies seem to lie with Foucault” (Stawarska 2019, 33); I advocate “a move 
beyond phenomenology to a Foucauldian genealogy” (36); I leave “phenomenological grounds 
behind” (39); and I advocate “the Foucauldian conception of  experience . . . as an alternative 
to the phenomenological conception” (35).
     I would like to make clear that my intention is not to side with Foucault against phenome-
nology. I have written extensively on the important continuities between phenomenology and 
Foucault’s thought elsewhere (e.g., Oksala 2005). In this book, my central argument is that 
immanent social critique must take the form of  transcendental philosophy and that “both phe-
nomenology and Foucault’s genealogy can be understood as engaging in transcendental phi-
losophy in this historical and critical sense” (Oksala 2016, 5). I contend that “they can therefore 
contribute important methodological insights and conceptual tools to the project of  feminist 
philosophy” (2016, 6).
     In other words, when I engage in critical investigations of  the phenomenological method, 
its conception of  the subject, and understanding of  language, I see my project as immanent 
critique. The book is an attempt to contribute to the phenomenological tradition and to apply 
its methods and insights for philosophical questions of  gender as well as for contemporary 
feminist political theory. As Gayle Salamon generously writes on the back cover, my aim is 
to help bring “phenomenology into the twenty-first century.” As far I understand, Salamon, 
Stawarska, and many other feminist philosophers share this project with me. Stawarska writes 
that “phenomenology needs to be transformed to accommodate the complex phenomenon of  
gender” and its conception of  the subject needs to be more radically historicized and politi-
cized than many phenomenologists have been prepared to do (39). Whether we call this project 
transformative phenomenology (Stawarska), post-phenomenology (Oksala), or perhaps critical 
phenomenology or political phenomenology, debating such labels should not be the decisive 
issue. Rather, the decisive issue should be what this transformation entails philosophically and 
politically. And that is what my book attempts to investigate.
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I.
I have to object to Stawarska’s first question which suggests that I am guilty of  venerating ca-
nonical male philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, 
at the expense of  feminist thinkers who still need to make a case for philosophical legitimacy 
insofar as they are feminists. Stawarska accuses me of  adopting a problematic reading strategy, 
which places feminist philosophy and feminist philosophers “on a lower shelf ” (33), reaffirms 
“a general trend of  devaluing feminist works” (36), and contributes to a “dismissal of  feminist 
philosophy.”
     It is difficult for me to respond to this accusation except by repeating here that the book ex-
plicitly defends the importance and contemporary relevance of  feminist philosophy. The very 
first sentence is: “The purpose of  this book is to provide a sustained defense of  feminist philos-
ophy” (2016, 3). I explain what I mean by feminist philosophy – it is a form of  social critique 
attempting to undertake a philosophical and critical analysis of  the world we live in – and then, 
again, sum up my aim: “My aim is thus not just to defend the importance of  feminist philos-
ophy in the above sense, but also to identify a series of  fundamental questions and challenges 
that such an understanding implies and that feminist philosophers have to face down (4). 
     I wrote this book because I firmly believe in the importance of  feminist philosophy, par-
ticularly  in this politically troubling time when many people believe that feminism is no lon-
ger relevant. The book is an attempt to contribute to the endeavor of  feminist philosophy by 
trying to strengthen some of  its foundations and by posing critical questions about its future. 
In other words, I want to make very clear that my aim is not to argue that the boomtown of  
feminist philosophy should be “replaced with foundational texts by non-feminist philosophers” 
(Stawarska 2019, 36). My interlocutors are not dead male philosophers, but rather, my fellow 
travelers in contemporary feminist philosophy: Christine Battersby, Joan Scott, Linda Alcoff, 
Sara Heinämaa, Sonia Kruks, Wendy Brown, and Christine Schuess, just to name a few sem-
inal contemporary feminist thinkers whose work I engage with. I am not treating their works 
“chiefly as objects of  critique”; they are my interlocutors (35). In other words, the aim of  the 
book is not “a recovery of  foundational texts in Foucauldian genealogy as well as Husserlian 
and Heideggerian phenomenology” (36). The book is first and foremost a contribution to the 
debates and discussions in contemporary feminist philosophy, and more specifically, to feminist 
appropriations of  and engagements with phenomenology and Foucault. The contention that 
my book would “benefit from including feminist phenomenological works in its philosophical 
library” is thus somewhat difficult for me to accept (34).
II. 
Stawarska’s second question requires a more complex response. She formulates her second 
problem as a general question on whether these omissions of  references from the feminist phil-
osophical library affect my argument, especially my “assessment of  phenomenology as a tra-
dition in need of  radical revision if  it is to be of  merit to an emancipatory project” (34). Later, 
Stawarska specifies that the key problem is the omission of  one particular reference: Simone de 
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. She contends that because I do not read this work, but merely “adopt 
an unexamined endorsement of  Sara Heinämaa’s reading of  it,” this leads to “a significant 
omission of  the founder of  feminist phenomenology’s work that affects the overall argument in 
the book” (37). 
     I would first like to note that it is not self-evident that Beauvoir is “the founder of  feminist phe-
nomenology” or that The Second Sex is “an exemplar of  a feminist phenomenological approach” 
(Stawarska 2019, 37). Feminist scholars such as Sara Heinämaa, Eva Gothlin, Beata Stawarska, 
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Debra Bergoffen, Bonnie Mann, Gail Weiss and Megan Burke have done groundbreaking work 
in identifying phenomenological influences in Beauvoir’s work and in spelling out her various 
contributions to the field of  feminist phenomenology. However, it is also well-documented that 
Beauvoir herself  did not identify as the founder of  feminist phenomenology. Instead, Beauvoir 
had a complex and conflicted relationship, not just to phenomenology, but to philosophy more 
generally, and even to feminism itself. The scope of  her philosophical interests and references 
was exceptionally broad. Positioning her as the founder of  feminist phenomenology is an inter-
pretative claim that can only be made retrospectively by her commentators. She can, and has 
been read also through other interpretative frames than phenomenology.  
     Barbara S. Andrew, for example, situates Beauvoir in philosophical thought by placing her 
work in four areas of  contemporary philosophy where her ideas remain influential: existential-
ism, phenomenology, social and political philosophy, and feminist theory. Rather than using 
one philosophical method of  analysis in The Second Sex, “she combines phenomenology, exis-
tentialism, psychology, historical materialism, and liberal political concerns to come up with a 
unique and comprehensive view of  women’s lived reality” (2003, 42). I, too, understand Beau-
voir’s position in the canon of  philosophy as being more complex than Stawarska assumes. I 
read Beauvoir as doing something different and more radical than “enact[ing] a methodolog-
ical transformation of  phenomenology” (Stawarska 2019, 38). Beauvoir does not discuss how 
we should understand the reductions, or whether we should give up the first-person perspec-
tive as the exclusive starting-point of  phenomenological investigation into the constitution of  
gender. She does not pose questions about the importance generative phenomenology, or take 
a stance on what we should understand by transcendental intersubjectivity. Rather, Beauvoir 
attempts to completely redraw the borders of  philosophy itself: she poses searching questions 
about what philosophy is. 
     As Claudia Card writes, Beauvoir consistently refused the label “philosopher” on the grounds 
that she did not offer a systematic comprehensive theory. Her topics were “not convention-
al among philosophers when she took them up…: psychoanalysis, biology, sexuality, gender, 
women, lesbians, prostitution, marriage, love” (Card 2003, 2). Perhaps even more importantly, 
her methodology was unconventional for philosophy. She used novels, diaries and memoirs 
as vehicles for doing philosophy, but also as the means of  exposing the limitations of  rational 
argumentation. For her, academic philosophy was a form of  discourse which was incapable 
of  making space for moral ambiguity, political complexity, and partial agency. She appropri-
ated what today would be called interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary methodologies and 
discarded the standard formats of  philosophical writing.  Hence, when I attempt to investigate 
whether phenomenology as a philosophical method can account for gender in chapter six, I do 
not discuss Beauvoir’s The Second Sex in detail because I do not read it as an application of  the 
phenomenological method or even as an explicit problematization of  it. 
     This is not the right context for debating our respective readings of  Beauvoir, however. The 
relevant question here is how my book could be improved and my central arguments trans-
formed if  I foregrounded The Second Sex as a central reference. And although Stawarska claims 
that my “omission of  the founder of  feminist phenomenology’s work . . . affects the overall 
argument in the book,” she also seems to admit that, had I made The Second Sex a central refer-
ence, the main philosophical conclusions of  my investigations would have remained essentially 
the same (39). Stawarska contends that although my critique of  the phenomenological method 
fails to recognize the compatibility of  Foucault’s genealogy and “Beauvoir’s feminist phenom-
enology (as read by Butler),” a more careful study of  these thinkers would show that “Oksa-
la’s Foucault and Butler’s Beauvoir” are essentially making similar arguments (39). Both “my 
Foucault” and “Butler’s Beauvoir” argue that the subject is constituted and critically transfor-
mative; they both insist that it is necessary to theorize the dialectical expansion of  subjectivity 
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and structure; they emphasize the significance of  subjugated knowledges as sites of  reflection 
and critique of  dominant social norms, as well as adopting the methodological imperative of  
engaging with empirical studies (39). In other words, a Butlerian reading of  Beauvoir would 
essentially bring us to the same philosophical conclusions as my reading of  Foucault and phe-
nomenology does in Feminist Experiences.
     In sum, Stawarska and I agree that “the goal of  social transformation grounded in feminist 
experiences can be realized by drawing on both traditions of  inquiry”—feminist appropria-
tions  of  Foucault’s historical ontology, as well as feminist phenomenology (39). I look forward 
to reading more of  Stawarska’s work on transformative phenomenology, as well as to learning 
how Beauvoir’s work, and transformative phenomenology more generally can contribute to 
our contemporary feminist critiques of  neoliberalism. I also appreciate the “good news that 
Oksala’s project can be partially carried out on the grounds of  feminist phenomenology itself,” 
since this is what I attempt to do in my book (39). However, I would also like to suggest caution 
regarding the idea that making a book on gender written by a woman the central reference is 
necessarily going to make our projects of  developing feminist phenomenology more feminist or 
philosophically relevant. And I cannot help thinking that Beauvoir would have unequivocally 
agreed with me on that point.
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